



I intend no irony when I say that I am grateful to Professor Brian Barry
for the attention he devoted to my Right and Wrong' in the January issue
of the Yale Law Journal.2 Nor do I think it generally seemly for authors
to argue with book reviewers, but I must protest against the palpably dis-
torted and inaccurate impression Barry gives of my stated position. Briefly,
he has me down as a stony-hearted libertarian somewhere between
Friedrich Hayek and Attila the Hun. He accomplishes this only by ignoring
until a brief paragraph at the end of his review3 my emphatic argument 4
that the needs and wants of our fellow man make affirmative moral claims
upon us,5 and that we are morally bound to work for and support institu-
tional structures that will exact from the more fortunate contributions to
meet the needs and wants of the less fortunate.0 I do not undertake to
specify the formula for that contribution, but suggest as two candidates
Rawls's maximin and equality principles.7
Barry notes my arguments regarding the constraints on the right to receive
and the duty to contribute a fair share of society's scarce resources: that
attributes of personality (talents, body parts) are not to be counted as among
society's scarce resources and so are not assessable in computing fair shares,
and that in the usual case other persons' needs do not make direct claims on
us-whether as citizens, lawyers, or doctors.8 He notes these constraints with-
out adverting to the very substantial positive rights and duties thus con-
strained. Though my raw talents or body parts are not assessable, my con-
sumption of goods and services is taxable and the taxes may be used to buy
both talents and blood for the less fortunate.9 Though I do not have a
general duty to relieve distress personally, I have a general duty to con-
tribute to institutions that will fairly relieve distress. If such institutions do
not exist, I have a duty to work to bring them about-as a lawyer or as a
citizen.10 Just institutions are a kind of clearinghouse for the duty of, and
right to, beneficence. And when anomalies cause these institutions to fail,
then the duty comes in directly and personally."
1. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. Barry, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 629 (1978).




7. P. 129 (discussing J. RAwis, A THEORY OF JUsTc (1970)).
8. Pp. 139-50, discussed in Barry, supra note 2, at 652-55.
9. P. 142.
10. Pp. 128-30, 187.
11. Pp. 130, 188-89.
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Correspondence
Finally, as to the callousness with which Barry argues I consider the situa-
tion of a person endangered by unintended but foreseen consequences of my
action, the discussion of the economic analysis of rights' 2 together with that
of positive rights,' 3 both of which Barry ignores, leads me to conclude that
a person negligently or recklessly risking harm to others "grabs more than
his fair share of a scarce resource, namely the moral space in which the
members of the community go about their business.... [He] is a kind of
thief, and what he does is wrong."' 4
Barry accuses me of "simple-mindedness,"'u rigidity, and reductionism.
He makes these charges seem plausible by ignoring a crucial part of my
argument. Perhaps this was because he concluded that the two halves of my
thesis do not fit coherently together. He should then have accused me
not of simple-mindedness but of muddleheadedness. In that event, however,





14. P. 159 (emphasis added).
15. Barry, supra note 2, at 635.
12. Pp. 81-107.
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